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ISENATE bill 636, introduced during the first session of the 84th Congress,1
represents a recent legislative effort to remedy some of the most pro-
nounced defects in the federal corrupt practices statutes. The centrally
underlying presupposition of this bill appears to be the conviction that full
disclosure of campaign contributions and increased responsibility in the field
of campaign finance requires initially a two-dimensional "centralization.",2
One, state primaries, caucuses, and conventions need to be subjected "verti-
cally" to federal law with respect to reports and limitations, inasmuch as such
elections represent, in effect, merely a first and inseparably connected phase
of any properly integrated campaign process. Two, for greater responsibility
in matters of financing and directing campaigns, the candidate ought to be
given much greater control over the collections and expenditures by political
committees and individuals allegedly organized on his behalf and in support
of his candidacy.
It is, of course, true that these major objectives of S. 636 are neither entire-
ly new nor unique in congressional thought.3 They have also proved for some
years most successful in the British approach to control over campaign finance
in Parliamentary elections. 4 At present the rather rigid limitations imposed by
t Professor of Political Science and Co-Chairman of the Department, Macalester Col-
lege. Visiting Professor of Political Science, University of Nebraska, 1955-56.
'The bill was introduced in the Senate on January 21, 1955, by Senator Hennings (D.,
Mo.) on behalf of himself and Senators Hayden, Green, and Gore. 101 Cong. Rec. $43
(1955). Representative Udall introduced a companion measure in the House, H.R. 3139,
84th Cong. 1st Sess. (1955), 101 Cong. Rec. 797 (1955).
2 Hearings before Senate Subcommittee on Privileges and Elections of Committee on
Rules and Administration on Sen. 636, 84th Cong. 1st Sess. (1955).
' Senator Gillette, chairman of the 1940 Committee on Campaign Expenditures, intro-
duced a measure containing very similar "centralization" provisions. Sen. 593, 78th Cong.
Ist Sess. (1943), 89 Cong. Rec. 447 (1943).
'The Representation of the People Act of 1918 incorporated very much strengthened
interpretations of the law of agency into the earlier Corrupt Practices Act of 1883. Con-
sult Butler, The Electoral System in Britain 9 (1953) ; McKenzie, British Political Parties
164 (1955): "It has not generally been noted that this act (Corrupt and Illegal Practices
Prevention Act of 1883] provided a very important stimulant to the development of the
mass party in this country."
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British law5 are predicated almost entirely on a candidate-centered responsi-
bility over campaign finance.8
In the United States also, recently passed statutes in Florida7 and Texas s
were based, much like the British, on a more candidate-centered control over
campaign finance. If there had still been any unawareness, in Congress or out,
of the need for continued attention and possible remedial federal legislation
in the realm of the corrupt practices statutes, none could have been left after
the recent explosive developments in connection with the revelations by Sen-
ator Case and the presidential veto of the natural gas bill.
The peculiar failure of federal and state statutes designed to control cam-
paign finance to achieve any significant degree of success has concerned
students of government and politics for many years. 9 Some have advocated
partial or complete government subsidy of campaign expenditures.' 0 With
5 450 pounds plus twopence for each parliamentary elector in a county constituency.
Penalties for the violation of the corrupt practices provisions are very severe and include
forfeiture of office. Consult British Information Service, Parliamentary Electoral Pro-
cedure in Britain 13 (1951).
' "No expenses shall, with a view to promoting or procuring the election of a candidate
at a parliamentary or local government election, be incurred by any person other than the
candidate, his election agent and persons authorised in writing by the election agent... Y
Representation of the People Act, 11 & 12 Geo. VI, c. 65, § 42(1) (1948). Also consult
Nicholas, The British General Election of 1950 19 (1951).
?Fla. Stat. (1955) § 99.161(4) (a).
9 Tex. Civ. Stat. Ann. (Vernon, 1952) § 14.04.
9Professor James K. Pollock, nationally known authority on election statutes, testified
in 1952: "I have found in looking over the books I wrote on the subjects some 20 years
ago, and in my previous testimony before senatorial and congressional committees during
these intervening years, that the situation has not changed very much, nor have we made
very much progress in improving our legislation either at the Federal level or at the State
level." Hearings before Special House Committee to Investigate Campaign Expenditures,
82d Cong. 2d Sess. 116 (1952). Also consult for general discussions, Overacker, Money in
Elections (1932); Key, Politics, Parties, and Pressure Groups (1952) ; Salt, American Par-
ties and Elections (4th ed., Penniman, 1948); Council of State Governments, Corrupt
Practices Legislation in the 48 States (1942) ; Sikes, State and Federal Corrupt Practices
Legislation (1928).
"President Theodore Roosevelt, in a message to Congress on December 3, 1907, sug-
gested that the federal government make grants to political parties and "that no party
receiving campaign funds from the Treasury should accept more than a fixed amount
from any individual subscriber or donor. . . ." Mr. McAdoo proposed that the "expenses
of a national election should be paid out of the . . .Treasury, and it should be made a
crime for a man to contribute a dollar to influence an election." Sikes, op. cit. supra note
9, at 249-50. Dr. Overacker contends that "such limitations are not only useless but posi-
tively pernicious," and insists that candidates who are not wealthy may put themselves
"under obligation to those who are"; that there is no scientific basis "for determining how
much a candidate or a party may spend, legitimately"; that "every attempt to apply limi-
tations in this country has proved an empty gesture"; that "it encourages subterfuge,
tends toward devolution of expenditure, and militates against the effectiveness of any pro-
gram of publicity" (which she strongly supports). Dr. Overacker also advocates state aid
in the form of publicity pamphlets and meeting places (school houses at "nominal cost
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the great increases in the cost of elections, public opinion also appears to be
dissatisfied with the sufficiency of the corrupt practices statutes." Congress.
particularly since the enactment of the important Hatch Political Activities
Act of 1939,12 has not been insensitive to these problems, and House and
Senate campaign expenditures committees have been ordered to conduct
numerous hearings and investigations."3
Some of the major defects in the federal regulatory statutes over cam-
paign finance as revealed in these hearings and field investigations appear to
center around the following somewhat interrelated areas: (1) the general
inapplicability of these laws to primary elections and elections to office in
political parties, caucuses, and conventions; 1 4 (2) the "unrealistic" and largely
for light, heat, and janitor service"). Overacker, op. cit. supra note 9, at 385, 393. Con-
sider also Professor Alexander Heard's plea during the hearings on Sen. 636, to "[a]bandon
the effort to impose ceilings on the amount that can be spent.. . [albandon the myth we
have nursed so long that campaign costs are 'too high.' They are neither too high nor too
low. They are simply what they are because of the necessities of campaigning in the
American political system." Hearings, supra note 2, at 104. Heard would like to see Con-
gress (1) assure responsible political competitors balanced access to radio and television,
(2) provide for annual personal income tax exemptions for individual political contribu-
tions ($500) per person, per committee, (3) limit personal contributions to something like
$3,000 per year, (4) regularize and simplify reporting. Ibid., at 105-16. Finally, consult the
Neuberger-Thompson legislative proposals introduced March 6, 1956 (Sen. 3242 and H.R.
9488, 84th Cong. 2d Sess. [1956]) urging federal subsidies to campaigns and the establish-
ment of a federal campaign contributions board supervising payments under the act to
the national committee of each major political party.
31 According to the Gallup poll sixty-seven per cent of the people questioned expressed
themselves in favor of a tightening of the laws dealing with campaign spending. Wash-
ington Post and Times Herald p. 14, col. 1 (June 2, 1955).
- 53 Stat. 1157 (1939), 18 U.S.C.A. § 595 (1950).
"Furthermore, Department of Justice officials under Democratic and Republican ad-
ministrations have found the corrupt practices statutes so defective as to be nearly un-
enforceable, or so vague as to give a completely unrealistic picture of the actual scope
of federal law. Hearings, supra note 2, at 197-215. Assistant Attorney General Warren
Olney III testified that in 1952 "there were 245 election law complaints which resulted in
139 investigations but only 2 prosecutions. In 1953 there were 92 complaints resulting in
54 investigations with but 1 prosecution. However, in 1954, there were 118 complaints
from which 68 investigations were made and which resulted in 56 indictments .... Those
figures on the number of investigations as compared with the number of cases resulting
from them is some indication of how common it is for people, complainants and others,
to suppose that the Federal laws do apply to factual situations but investigation reveals
that the Federal statutes are not applicable." Hearings, supra note 2, at 199.
1" E.g., Report of the House Special Committee to Investigate Campaign Expenditures
No. 2517, 82d Cong. 2d Sess. 57 (1953); ibid., No. 3252, 81st Cong. 2d Sess. 21 (1951);
Report of the House Special Committee on Campaign Expenditures No. 2469, 80th Cong.
2d Ses. 45 (1948); Report of the Senate Special Committee to Investigate Senatorial
Campaign Expenditures, 1946, No. 1, part 2, 80th Cong. 1st Sess. 36 (1947) ; Report of
the Senate Special Committee to Investigate the Presidential, Vice Presidential, and Sen-
atorial Campaign Expenditures for 1944, No. 101, 79th Cong. 1st Sess. 40, 80, 81 (1945).
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unenforceable expenditure limitations specified by these laws; 15 and (3) the
tendency of these laws to facilitate the proliferation, decentralization, and dif-
fusion of political campaign committees. 16
II
Federal statutes provide with respect to the structure of campaign finance,
among other things, that political committees functioning in one or more
states or in a subsidiary intrastate capacity must have a designated chairman
and treasurer,17 must maintain detailed records of contributions and expendi-
tures' s (including the names and addresses of the persons contributing $100
or more),' 9 and file periodic reports with the Clerk of the House of Repre-
sentatives. 20 Individual reports must also be filed with the Clerk of the
House by persons contributing $50 or more, not to a political committee, but
"for the purpose of influencing in two or more states the election of candi-
dates. '"21 National banks, corporations and labor unions are prohibited from
making a "contribution or expenditure in connection with any election" to any
federal office or in connection with "any primary election or political con-
vention or caucus held to select candidates for any political office." 22
Candidates for the United States Senate and the House of Representatives
are limited to a maximum campaign expenditure of $25,000 and $5,000
respectively.23 Political committees functioning in one or more states or as a
I E.g., Hearings, supra note 2, at 2; House Committee Report No. 3252, supra note 14,
at 23; Report of the House Special Committee on Campaign Expenditures, 1946, No. 2739,
79th Cong. 2d Sess. 43 (1947); Senate Committee Report No. 1, part 2, supra note 14,
at 37; Senate Committee Report No. 101, supra note 14, at 82; Report of the Senate
Special Committee to Investigate Presidential, Vice-Presidential, and Senatorial Campaign
Expenditures for 1940, No. 47, 77th Cong. 1st Sess. 13, 80 (1941).
" E.g., Hearings, supra note 2, at 2; House Committee Report No. 3252, supra note 14,
at 24, 25; Senate Committee Report No. 47, supra note 15, at 13; Senate Report No. 101,
supra note 14, at 5, 80, 81.
1743 Stat. 1071 (1925), 2 U.S.C.A. § 242 (1927).
' Ibid., at 1070, § 241: "'contribution' includes a gift, subscription, loan, advance, or
deposit, of money, or anything of value, and includes a contract, promise, or agreement,
whether or not legally enforceable to make a contribution. . . . '[E]xpenditure' includes a
payment, distribution, loan, advance, deposit, or gift, or money, or anything of value, and
includes a contract, promise, or agreement, whether or not legally enforceable, to make an
expenditure."
19 Ibid., at 1071, § 244. Ibid. -Ibid., at 1072, § 245.
'-62 Stat. 723 (1948), as amended, 2 U.S.C.A. § 610 (1950).
-43 Stat. 1073 (1925), 2 U.S.C.A. § 248 (1927). Also note that "[m]oney expended by
a candidate . . . for his necessary personal, traveling, or subsistence expenses, or for sta-
tionery, postage, writing, or printing (other than for use on billboards or in newspapers),
for distributing letters, circulars, or posters, or for telegraph or telephone service, shall
not be included in determining whether his expenditures have exceeded the sum fixed."
Ibid.
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subsidiary of a national organization may not collect or expend more than
$3,000,000 during any calendar year.2 4 A $5,000 limitation also is imposed on
individual contributions made in support of the nomination or election of a
candidate for federal office or in support of a political party. 5 Aside from
these stipulations of expenditure limitations, federal statutes explicitly pro-
hibit employees of the executive branch, and such employees of state gov-
ernments connected with activities financed "in whole or in part" by loans or
grants made by the United States, from active political participation and
from "using their official authority" in influencing elections. 28
Even a most cursory analysis of the various state corrupt practices statutes
dealing with the structure of campaign finance, reveals significant differences
in the scope of elections covered, in the type of financial reporting required,
and in the form and level of money limitations specified for the various offices
and committees. Thirty-two out of the forty-eight states have some kind of
limit upon federal and major state candidacies. 27 Different forms of maxima
are employed: specified dollar limitations per office, 28 percentages based on
the annual salary for the office,29 or base figures to be multiplied by the num-
ber of votes cast at the last preceding election.30 In six states the limitations
affect the primaries only; nine states require a statement from the candidate
only, whereas thirty-three states require statements of campaign receipts and
disbursements from both candidates and political committees. Eighteen states
apply campaign limitations to general and primary elections separately;
,62 Stat. 723 (1948), 18 U.S.C.A. § 609 (1950).
Ibid., at § 608. Senator Hatch wanted these specific limitations, which were offered as
an amendment by Senator Bankhead, to be rigidly construed as all inclusive totals. "[W]hen
the bill was considered in the House, it was amended to exempt the State committees and
others, which does give, and probably legally, the right for an individual to make as
,many $5,000 contributions to different committees as he desires. I say 'probably legally'-
I don't think it was the intention of the original act." Hearings before Senate Subcom-
mittee on Privileges and Elections, 78th Cong. 2d Sess. 6 (1944).
256 Stat. 986, 18 U.S.C. § 61 (a, g, n, s, u) (1942), amended by 62 Stat. 720 (1948),
18 U.S.C.A. § 595 (1950). For a recent study consult Nelson, Public Employees and the
Right To Engage in Political Activity, 9 Vand. L. Rev. 27 (1955). There are additional
laws against the solicitation of civil servants in sixteen states. Ibid., at 33.
- Ford, Regulation of Campaign Finance 3 (1955). These tabulations, revised and cor-
rected, are based on some earlier data published in Bottomley, Corrupt Practices in Po-
litical Campaigns, 30 B.U.L. Rev. 331 (1950), and in the publication by the Council on
State Governments, op. cit. supra note 9.
For the gubernatorial candidate it may range from $50,000 in Alabama to $2,000 in
Idaho. Ford, op. cit. supra note 27, at 33.
For the gubernatorial office the range is from fifty per cent of the annual salary in
Iowa and South Dakota to ten per cent in Kansas. Ibid.
I For example in Michigan the limitation is $20 for each 1,000 votes cast for the office
of governor, but with a minimum fixed at twenty-five per cent of the annual salary.
Ibid., at 34.
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thirty-one states prohibit contributions by corporations and five states ex-
tend this to labor unions specifically. Although limiting contributions by in-
dividuals, corporations, or labor unions, Delaware, Florida, Louisiana, and
Nebraska impose no limit at all on campaign expenditures for their guber-
natorial or federal candidates.3 1
Stipulated expenditure limitations such as $5,000 for United States Repre-
sentative, $25,000 for United States Senator and $3,000,000 for national or
inter-state committees, do not appear very realistic in the light of some of the
recent campaign expenditure compilations.3 2 A forty-eight-state survey by
the New York Times in 1952 revealed that campaign spending by all the
parties, political organizations, independent committees, and candidates came
to an estimated total of $32,155,251. 3 Congressional Quarterly, on the basis
of its own research, gives the following totals of reported spending by parties,
committees, and candidates:
1950 ............................ $10,901,46334
1952 ............................ $ 5,584,688s 5
1954 ............................ $13,662,41436
Of course, variations in report forms and procedures, duplicated expendi-
ture figures (when the national committees transfer funds to their respective
state organizational subsidiaries), and incomplete reports3 7 are only some of
the factors that prevent these tabulations from being anything but mere ap-
proximations.
Perhaps the peculiar inadequacy of some of the fixed limitations can ac-
tually be better illustrated by the expenditures for radio and television, the
basic campaign media used by the two presidential candidates and their
' Ibid., at 33-42.
'In five senatorial contests in the 1954 election, $50,000 was the minimum reported.
The highest expenditure for representative was $42,639.42 in Ohio's ninth congressional
district. 11 Cong. Q. Almanac 722, 723 (1955).
' N.Y. Times p. 1, col. 5 (Dec. 1, 1952).
11 Cong. Q. Almanac 725 (1955).
Ibid. This figure does not include money spent in the presidential campaign.
Ibid.
"Of the . . . 117 organizations which appear to be required to file periodic reports
during the calendar year of 1946, only 47 have filed any reports. Of those filing reports,
in very few instances have the reports been filed for each period required under the act."
House Special Committee Report No. 2739, supra note 15, at 39. Also consult Senate
Special Committee Report No. 47, supra note 15, at 15. With respect to the various state
court decisions relating to state filing requirements, Professor Harry Best noted that,
"while the courts [will] insist upon a full and sincere obedience to the laws, and will
permit no omissions or evasions with respect to essential matters, they are content for the
most part to exact compliance only with the material provisions, allowing greater or less
latitude in regard to minor details." Sen. Doc. No. 203, 76th Cong. 3d Sess. 33 (1940).
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supporters in the 1952 election.3 8 On the Columbia Broadcasting network for
television alone, the Eisenhower supporters spent $262,736.16 for a total of
three hours and thirty minutes. The Stevenson supporters paid $237,449.76
for their four hours and forty-five minutes. C.B.S. radio showed expenditures
of $136,642.57 for Mr. Eisenhower and $212,690.53 for Mr. Stevenson.8"
Perhaps the most significant factor in the election expenditure picture,
aside from the increase in cost, is the notable degree to which spending by
political committees has tended to overshadow spending by the candidate.
Twenty-seven GOP groups spent $5,517,826.05 or fifty-three per cent of the
total of all reported Republican expenditures. The figure for the Democratic
groups was $2,224,210.93 or twenty-two per cent; to this must be added
almost all of the political expenditures by labor groups which, with their
$2,057,613.06, represented twenty per cent of the total spending by groups
or organizations. 40
The particular usefulness of political committees under the Hatch Acts as
interpreted should not be surprising when it is recalled that, unless operating
nationally or in an inter-state capacity, they need not report federally, that
they assist the candidate in staying within legal limits, and that they have in
fact become the widely accepted devices by which wealthy supporters and
their families may properly diffuse their largess in legal multiple gifts of
$5,000. 41
This decentralization and proliferation 42 of campaign finance via multiple
committees-national, state, and local-represents the major pattern of
formal adjustment to the overly rigid and unrealistic limitations of the
Hatch Acts. This is not a new phenomenon. Only one year after passage of
the first Hatch Act, a Senate committee investigating campaign spending in
the 1940 election found:
[Tihe Hatch Act has been ineffective in preventing the expenditure of enormous
sums of money ... [tihe $3,000,000 limitation . . . served to direct the flow of
'According to Professor Heard's testimony, in 1952 "approximately 16.8% (or $375,-
693.92) of the net expenditures of the Democratic National Committee, and approximately
21.4% (or $645,125.83) of the net expenditures of the Republican National Committee,
went for radio and television costs." Hearings, supra note 2, at 105.
'Testimony of Mr. Richard S. Salant, Vice President, C.B.S. Ibid., at 168.
o 11 Cong. Q. Almanac 729 (1955).
"k €[I]n 1954, it appears that 10 members of the Rockefeller family gave an aggregate
of $66,000 to various Republican campaign committees." Ibid., at 727. Of course, these
gifts are made by wealthy families to both political parties. The Congressional Almanac
provides a state by state listing of individual contributions of $1,000 and over, along with
the various recipient party organizations and political committees. Ibid., at 748-56.
'
2 In the 1954 Oregon senatorial contest, for example, former Senator Cordon (R. Ore.)
reported no expenses for himself but registered with the Oregon Secretary of State a total
expenditure of $141,264.01 spent on his behalf by not less than thirty state committees
and four individuals. Hearings, supra note 40, at 726.
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campaign funds in excess of that amount into channels other than those of the
traditional national party committees, i.e.-[i]ndependent political committees, each
of which believed itself legally entitled to spend up to $3,000,000 ... State or local
committees ostensibly supporting State candidates but actually working for the na-
tional party ticket as well ... individuals desiring to contribute more than $5,000
found it only necessary to donate or loan any desired sum to a State or local com-
mittee, which might spend the money without restriction.43
These conclusions have since been reinforced by volumes of additional testi-
mony and investigations.
To this Cvertical" decentralization of control over campaign finance, ac-
centuated by the failure of the federal acts generally to view primaries as
integral and indivisible parts of the election process, must then be added a
second and perhaps equally significant factor. Judicial decisions, particularly
by state courts, have so molded the law of agency, as it relates to the corrupt
practices statutes, as to divide nearly completely responsibility over campaign
finance between the candidate on one hand, and the political committees
organized in his support on the other.44 Statutes in eighteen states place the
expenditure limitations not only on the candidate alone, but on all those
political committees making disbursements on his behalf with his knowledge
and consent.45 Judicial interpretations, however, have construed the principal-
agent relationship to require evidence of direct and specific authority before
it is possible to charge the principal (candidate) with any violation of such
legal limits, appear to have contributed much in rendering the enforcement
of such provisions most difficult.
The political implications flowing from the decentralization and diffusion
over the control of campaign finance have not escaped the attention of the
national leadership in both major political parties.46 Some of the practical
Report of Senate Special Committee No. 47, supra note 15, at 13.
"Danniell v. Gregg, 97 N.H. 452, 91 A. 2d 461 (1952) ; Veal v. Thompson, 287 Ky. 742,
155 S.W. 2d. 214 (1941); Bell Telephone Co. of Pa. v. Pinchot, 44 Pa. D. & C. 119 (Dist.
Ct., 1941); Kommers v. Palagi, 111 Mont. 293, 108 P. 2d 208 (1940); Wheeler v. Marshall,
280 Ky. 55, 132 S.W. 2d 519 (1939); Kearney's Account, 136 Pa. Sup. 78, 7 A. 2d 159
(1939) ; Gallagher v. Campbell, 267 Ky. 370, 102 S.W. 2d 340 (1937) ; Dyche v. Scolville,
270 Ky. 196, 109 S.W. 2d 581 (1937); Trones v. Olson, 197 Minn. 21, 265 N.W. 806
(1936); Mariette v. Murray, 185 Minn. 620, 242 N.W. 331 (1932); Hicks v. Frazer, 118
Cal. App. 777, 1 P. 2d 1096 (1931); Hardin v. Horn, 184 Ky. 548, 212 S.W. 573 (1919);
Rees v. Nash, 142 Minn. 260, 171 N.W. 781 (1919) ; Harrison v. Nimocks, 119 Minn. 535,
137 N.W. 972 (1912); Bechtel's Election Case, 39 Pa. Sup. 292 (1908); State v. Bland,
144 Mo. 534, 46 S.W. 440 (1898). Also see Newberry v. U.S., 256 U.S. 232 (1921); al-
though this case did not center primarily around this question, a majority of the court
apparently did conceive the principal-agent relationship between Mr. Newberry and his
supporters very much in line with the above cases. Also consult Sen. Doc. No. 203, supra
note 37, at 21.
"Ford, op. cit. supra note 27, at 33-35.
"According to the chairman of the Republican National Committee, the process "has
weakened party responsibility and discipline." Hearings before Senate Subcommittee on
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consequences arising out of this "horizontal" and "vertical" decentralization
are occasionally revealed most dramatically in the hearings of congressional
campaign investigating committees. The following "bi-partisan" illustrations
are submitted in the belief that they may help to indicate something of the
degree to which failure in the control over finances, and, to an important
extent, over the entire campaign, may be traced back directly to this divorce
between the candidate and his supporters.
The first "exhibit" is taken from the 1950 senatorial campaign in Ohio in
which Mr. Joseph Ferguson unsuccessfully opposed Mr. Robert A. Taft, the
incumbent.
Sen. Margaret Chase Smith: What control did you [Mr. Ferguson] have over
your campaign? ... Who planned the radio programs, the television, the itinerary,
and the literature? Who decided when and where to spend the money and in what
amounts, and when did the campaign against Mr. Taft begin?
Mr. Ferguson: Well, you know when you don't have any money to spend, you
don't have to do any planning, so I didn't have any money to spend so I didn't
have any planning to do.
Now if you are talking, Mrs. Smith, about who arrived at the decision to print
the funny books and some of the other literature, that was printed by, I think, the
CIO. I am not sure. Of course, they didn't ask me anything about it. It wasn't any
of my money. I didn't have any control.
If somebody wanted to go out and spend $100 for me, they would probably go
and do it. I wouldn't know anything about it....
Sen. Smith: Did you make the plans for the radio and the literature?
Mr. Ferguson: No I didn't have any money to make radio plans and anything
like that. I didn't make any plans for those. My committee made those plans, I
think, but I didn't have any money personally. I was out campaigning. I was out
hitting the sticks. ....
Sen. Smith: I just wondered where the decisions were made. It seems that some-
one has to make decisions and plans.
Mr. Ferguson: I always conduct my own campaign. Now, when people spent
money in my behalf, if you are referring to the funny book and those things, I
didn't have anything to do with making those up.
Sen. Smith: Yet that was a part of your campaign.
Mr. Ferguson: I wouldn't say it was a part of my campaign. It was to this ex-
tent: That they [the people who spent money on his behalf] were campaigning to
beat Mr. Taft. I was campaigning to beat Mr. Taft, too, but I was campaigning on
the limited amount of expenses I had available to me personally.
Sen. Smith: Then there were actually two parts to your campaign?
Mr. Ferguson: Yes.
Privileges and Elections, 82d Cong. 1st and 2d Sess. 69 (1952). Mr. Boyle, speaking as
chairman of the Democratic National Committee testified that instead of the money com-
ing into the national committees of the parties, "it has led to those funds being spread out
to different types of unknown committees, unsponsored committees . . . these committees
have no real responsibility either to the national committee of the Republican Party or
the Democratic Party." Ibid., at 7.
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Sen. Smith: Your own activities and the activities of the other group.
Mr. Ferguson: I would say that this is probably a correct answer.47
The second illustration is taken from another bitterly fought 1950 senato-
rial campaign, the contest in Maryland between the present junior senator
from that state, Mr. John Marshall Butler, and the then incumbent, Mr.
Tydings.
Mr. McDermott [Chief Counsel]: What is that again, this short-circuiting busi-
ness?
Mr. Jonkel [Mr. Butler's campaign manager]: Well, you call it a technique. I
would call it an expediency.
If a check came in, instead of sending it to Mr. Mundy [campaign treasurer to
Mr. Butler], and Mr. Mundy depositing it, and then we would have to draw back to
pay somebody, instead of doing that if Mr. Fedder [owner, National Advertising
Co., Baltimore, Md.] came in, or any other person, I don't know who they were,
they were ad infinitum, and if they insisted that if they did not have some money
they would not mail things that were ready to be mailed, or we would not get
things to be given to the workers, or we would go off the air, I would give them
checks as a partial payment to keep them off my neck, frankly.
Mr. McDermott: So some of the campaign funds which were received in Mr.
Butler's campaign headquarters were not transmitted to the official campaign
treasurer; is that correct?
Mr. Jonkel: That is right- ..
Sen. Hennings: Were any books kept in your office at all?
Mr. Jonkel: I don't think so, other than the kind of these transmittal letters
[occasional acknowledgments]. You see the money, Senator, really should have
gone to the treasurer, but our treasurer was never active in the campaign. [These
short-circuited funds totalled between $21,000-$27,000.] 48
Sen. Hennings: So that some checks were sent to Mr. Mundy for official record-
ing by the campaign treasurer and other checks were not sent to him, nor was any
notice given to him of their receipt, is that true?
Mr. Jonkel: Well, as it turned out; yes sir. If these people didn't receive notice
or an acknowledgement from anybody else they did not get one from me, then they
have not, nobody has ever told them about it, to the best of my knowledge....
Sen. Smith: Whom did you discuss them [the contributions] with?
Mr. Jonkel: When?
Sen. Smith: Any time.
Mr. Jonkel: I say, I may have told Senator Butler about it. The people in my
office knew about it. I mean, the people that I paid the bills to. .. . I don't re-
member actively or actually discussing it with anyone. I may have told Senator
Butler. I probably did say, "Mr. Butler, we had a good deal. We got some money
today." 49
'17Hearings before Senate Subcommittee on Privileges and Elections to Investigate the
1950 Ohio Senatorial Campaign, 82d Cong. 1st and 2d Sess. 123-24 (1952).
"Hearings, infra note 49, at 196, 204.
" Hearings before Senate Subcommittee on Privileges and Elections, 82nd Cong. 1st Sess.
205, 208-9 (1951).
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Mr. Jonkel was indicted, tried and found guilty for failure to report
properly contributions and expenditures in the Butler campaign.50 Yet despite
Mr. Jonkel's proven violation of law, a Senate investigating committee
found that there was no specific evidence that candidate John Marshall
Butler had "full knowledge" that his campaign manager, whom he had given
blanket authority, had "committed these acts," and that in this campaign
"[ift was a matter of the campaign manager and the campaign headquarters
directing candidate Butler rather than candidate Butler directing the cam-
paign manager and the campaign headquarters." 51
I
Under the provisions of S. 636 which specifically deal with the "centraliza-
tion" issue,5 2 (1) primaries, presidential preferential primaries, and elections
to party caucus and conventions as well as the general elections are all made
subject to federal control; 53 (2) all political committees organized for the
support of a candidate would be required to file a report with the Clerk of
the House of Representatives (the Secretary of the Senate in some cases), as
well as with the Clerk of the U.S. District Court;5 4 (3) candidates would
be given complete control as well as individual responsibility over their com-
mittee's financial campaign activities:
No contribution shall be accepted, and no expenditures made, by or on behalf of
a political committee for the purpose of supporting the candidacy of a candidate
until the candidate (or a representative designated by him in writing) has author-
ized in writing the political committee to support his candidacy and has filed a
copy of such authorization with the Clerk of the House of Representatives.55
Constitutionally the concurrence of federal-state jurisdiction with respect
to elections rests on rather explicit sources governing the office of president"
'Sen. Rep. No. 647, 82d Cong. 1st Sess. 3 (1951).
'hIbid., at 5.
'No effort has been made to deal with such various other important provisions of
Sen. 636 as the raising of the legal expenditure limitations to a maximum of $250,000 and
that for a representative to $25,000; the additional duties of enforcement and publicity
given to the Clerk of the House; new requirements as to the filing of reports by the
candidate and by those contributing more than $100; and the new maximum $10,000 limit
for individual contributions.
'Sen. 636, 84th Cong. 1st Sess. § 102(1), (2) (1955).
-Ibid., at §§ 205, 206, 202, 201. These financial reports filed periodically by the com-
mittee treasurer would have to show in addition to categorized and totalled receipts and
disbursements such other items as the names and addresses of persons contributing more
than $100 [§ 202(a) (1)] and those receiving payments of $10 or more [§ 202(a)(4)]. The
purpose of such expenditures would also have to be indicated [§ 202(b) (1)1.
'Ibid., at § 201(a)(1). Provision is also made for a formal withdrawal in § 201(a) (2).
'U.S. Const. Art. 2, § 1, and the Twelfth Amendment.
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and the election of senators and representatives.57 Additional congressional
power for legislatively implementing the constitutional provisions may, of
course, also be found in the "necessary and proper" clause.58 This con-
current federal-state jurisdiction was rather narrowly construed in the New-
berry case59 by Justice McReynolds. In open conflict with four colleagues
who for different reasons had concurred in the majority opinion written by
him, McReynolds, J., very pointedly refused to acknowledge any congression-
al power over state primaries or conventions.
This constitutional distinction between primaries and general elections was
to be removed explicitly in the Classic case 0 twenty-one years later. There
is little doubt now, in view of that decision and a number of similar rulings
in other cases,6' that federal statutes aiming at a so-called vertical integra-
tion in control over campaign finance should be able to meet the constitu-
tional test successfully. As a matter of fact, certain types of campaign finance
activities in conjunction with primary elections and election to political con-
ventions have already been specifically subjected to federal control by the
Labor Management Relations Act of 1947.62
A second and much more complicated set of constitutional questions is
posed by provisions in S. 636 that call for what might be labeled "horizontal"
or candidate-centered controls over campaign finance. This type of control
may, for the purpose of analysis, be divided into two inseparable and inter-
dependent elements, each posing a distinct constitutional problem of its own.
First, an outright injunction or prohibition against spending by political
committees on behalf of a candidate without the latter's specific approval.
Second, a subjecting of all political committees that wish to make contribu-
tions or expenditures on behalf of a certain candidate to the requirement of
obtaining specific authorization from such a candidate or his treasurer before
they may operate within the all-inclusive dollar limitations established for
such a candidacy.
In the past it appears that both state and federal courts have tended to
uphold rather uniformly those provisions of the corrupt practices statutes
that prohibited political campaign contributions, solicitations, or expendi-
' U.S. Const. Art. 1, § 4, and the Seventeenth Amendment.
'U.S. Const. Art. 1, § 8.
'Newberry v. United States, 256 U.S. 232 (1921).
'United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299 (1941).
E.g., United Public Workers of America v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75 (1947); Smith v.
Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944); United States v. Norris, 300 U.S. 564 (1937).
U 62 Stat. 723 (1948), as amended, 18 U.S.C.A. § 610 (1950). This act, as amended, had
extended further the prohibitions against political contributions and expenditures by na-
tional banks or corporations so as to include labor unions.
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tures by such specific groups of the electorate as corporations 3 and civil
servants. 4 In Oklahoma v. U.S. Civil Service Commission,5 the Hatch Act
restrictions on the political activities of federal employees was even extended
to those employed by state and local governments who worked on projects
partly or entirely supported by federal funds.
Recently, however, when the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947 ex-
panded the prohibitions of the federal Corrupt Practices Acts against political
expenditures and contributions to include labor unions, 66 the Supreme Court
took a second sober look and raised some serious doubt as to the constitution-
ality of such restrictions.6 7 The issue seems to be the distance to which Con-
gress may go in legislatively implementing the constitutional "freedom and
purity of election" objective" without, at the same time, unwarrantedly abridg-
ing the freedoms guaranteed under the First Amendment. In the C10 69 case,
this was the central issue to Justice Rutledge and three other justices who
joined him in the concurring opinion. "The presumption [when legislation in-
' United States v. United States Brewers' Ass'n., 239 Fed. 163 (W.D. Pa., 1916).
"United Public Workers of America v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75 (1947); United States v.
Wurzbach, 280 U.S. 396 (1930); People v. Murray, 307 Ill. 349, 138 N.E. 649 (1923);
State v. Fairbanks, 187 Ind. 648, 115 N.E. 769 (1917) ; People v. Gansley, 191 Mich. 357,
158 N.W. 195 (1916); Ex parte Curtis, 106 U.S. 371 (1882). Also consult Essman, The
Hatch Act-A Reappraisal, 60 Yale L.J. 986 (1951), and Nelson, op. cit. supra note 26,
at 33.
330 U.S. 127 (1947).
'Labor's leadership, of course, contends that there is a tremendous difference between
"corporations" and "unions" in structure and purpose, and that it is erroneous to treat
them alike with reference to prohibitions against political contributions. "Corporations
are private institutions organized for the sake of making a profit. Trade-unions are
voluntary associations formed for the purpose of benefiting the economic and social
status of their members .... Trade-union members expect and instruct their officers to
engage in those activities which will achieve the social and economic ends they seek,
and these activities have traditionally included advice and information concerning polit-
ical issues and candidates. . . . These activities are, in turn, subject to the constant
scrutiny of trade-union members who have the opportunity to express their disapproval
or approval and to revise or reverse their instruction to their officers. Corporation exec-
utives are under no similar compulsions and the purposes of their charters . . . differ
vastly in their intent and purpose from the constitutions of trade-union organizations."
Statement by Jack Kroll, Director, CIO-PAC, Hearings before Special House Committee
to Investigate Campaign Expenditures for 1952, 82d Cong. 2d Sess. 219 (1952).
'United States v. CIO, 335 U.S. 106 (1948). Also see United States v. Construction and
General Laborers Union No. 264, 101 F. Supp. 869 (W.D. Mo., 1951); United States v.
Painters Local Union No. 481, 172 F. 2d 854 (C.A. 2d, 1949).
'U.S. Const. Art. 1, § 4.
'United States v. CIO, 335 U.S. 106 (1948). Justice Reed, writing the majority opinion
did not, however, feel called upon to rule on the constitutionality of Section 610, insisting
that this was unnecessary since the indictment failed to state an offense. He held for
the union on the ground that the intent of the framers of this act, as reflected in the
debates on the floor of the U.S. Senate, was not to bar the type of political expenditure
as represented by the political advertisement in the CIO News, inasmuch as this paper
was published and paid for largely by the union membership.
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terferes with the First Amendment] rather is against the legislative intrusion
into these domains. For, while not absolute, the enforced surrender of those
rights must be justified by the existence and immediate impendency of dangers
to the public interest. . .."',7
S. 636 does not enjoin any financial campaign activities by political com-
mittees or groups per se. What is prohibited are such activities "on behalf" of
a candidate without the latter's specific written authority.71 Its constitu-
tionality as a regulatory measure would seem to fall into a much more per-
missive orbit than where it is a matter of an outright prohibition. Its pro-
visions do not seem to destroy what Justice Rutledge called "the expression of
organized viewpoints concerning matters affecting their vital interest at the
most crucial point [publication] where the expression would become effec-
tive."7
To allay further doubts as to the constitutionality of S. 636, Section
201 (a) might perhaps be amended to include a provision to the effect that
a committee wishing to support a candidate without his approval would be
required to point out prominently that its literature or any of its other vari-
ous forms of campaign activities (1) have not been authorized by the candi-
date and (2) that the candidate cannot be held to assume any responsibility
whatever for its content. This obviously negative endorsement in the highly
candidate-centered practice of American politics adds materially to the at-
tractiveness of submitting to a candidate-centered control over campaign
finance. It would additionally strengthen the constitutional position of such
legislation.
The second constitutional facet of candidate-centered control over cam-
paign finance-a written authorization by him as a condition precedent to
such committee activities on his behalf-was presented in a recent Florida
case.73 Largely as an outgrowth of the shocking extent of campaign irregu-
larities, revealed before a committee of the Florida legislature, a new corrupt
practices act had been passed in 1951. 4 In addition to an outright prohibi-
tion of political contribution and expenditures by certain enumerated eco-
nomic interests,75 the act provided that "[n]o contribution or expenditure of
money or other thing of value . . shall be made, received, or incurred,
o United States v. CIO, 335 U.S. 106, 140 (1948).
§ 201(a) (1).
-United States v. CIO, 335 U.S. 106, 150 (1948).
Smith v. Ervin, 64 S. 2d 166 (Fla., 1953).
"' Fla. L. (1951) c. 26819.
1 Persons or corporations holding permits or licenses for dog and horse racing; for
the sale of intoxicating beverages; operators of public utilities; members of non-profit
cooperative associations. Fla. Stat. (1955) S 99.161(1) (a-c).
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directly or indirectly" in support of candidates for state office "except
through [a] duly appointed campaign treasurer."7 6
The Florida Supreme Court, in a four-to-two decision, affirmed the lower
court's rejection of the contention that the new statute represented an un-
constitutional infringement of freedom of speech and press. The statutory
requirement by which a citizen, wishing to come to the aid of a candidate
with the purchase of advertising and radio time, could be made to seek
prior candidate approval for such activities on his behalf, was held by the
court to constitute an appropriate exercise of the state's police power.
77
A central premise of the Florida law was the assumption that the best "en-
forcement" of reasonable expenditures does not demand fixed dollar limita-
tions but popular scrutiny of frequent, accurate, and widely circulated pre-
election publicity7" as to the source and extent of a candidate's financial
contributions.7 9
While the law certainly could not guarantee an end to all illegal campaign
contributions, its actual operation in the 1952 Democratic gubernatorial
primary proved highly successful.8 0
S. 636 represents an effort to use the Florida type of candidate-centered
control over campaign finance as a technique not for removing the concept of
the Hatch Act limitations, but rather for making it possible to hold the
" Ibid., at (4) (a). Also note the very similar Texas provision that "it shall be unlawful
for any person, other than a candidate, his campaign manager, or his assistant campaign
manager, to make or authorize any campaign expenditure." 9 Tex. Civ. Stat. Ann.
(Vernon, 1952) § 14.04(d). A New Jersey campaign finance statute of this candidate-
centered type has been relatively ineffective, since under 1 N.J. Rev. Stat. (1937) c. 19.
§ 3-8, a candidate may blanketly "disavow" all illegal expenditures made on his behalf.
For the practical operation of this, see Overacker, Money in Elections 330-33 (1932).
Under Section 99.161(7) of the Florida statute, supra note 75, there can also be no
expenditures on behalf of a candidate without a written order by the treasurer, author-
izing such disbursements on a form provided by the state and drawn upon a special
account with a properly designated state bank.
'Smith v. Ervin, 64 S. 2d 166 (Fla., 1953). But in State v. Pierce, 163 Wis. 615,
158 N.W. 696 (1916), a provision prohibiting campaign expenditures by persons other
than the candidate, his permanent campaign committee or a party committee, was held
unconstitutional as an unreasonable interference with the Declaration of Rights of the
Wisconsin Constitution, Art. I, § 3. Consult, Minnesota Corrupt Practices Act: A Critique
of the Fixed Campaign Limitations, 40 Minn. L. Rev. 156, 165 (1955).
' Fla. Stat. (1955) § 99.161.
"' Candidates for U.S. senator and governor must file weekly reports; all others
monthly. Ibid. Mr. Gray, Florida Secretary of State, said: "I do not wish to exaggerate,
but I frequently had to shove reporters out of the way before I could get the papers
filed myself, because they would grab them just as soon as they came in .... There was
splendid publicity. . . ." Hearings of the House Special Committee to Investigate Cam-
paign Expenditures, 1952, 82d Cong. 2d Sess. 175 (1952).
' Professor Roady concluded that "it might well be used as a model for regulating
money in national campaigns." Roady, Florida's New Campaign Expense Law and the
1952 Democratic Gubernatorial Primaries, 48 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 465, 476 (1954).
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candidate effectively responsible for the bill's newly proposed and more
realistic dollar limitations. Constitutionally, the written authorization feature
rather than constituting possibly an additional infringement upon the guaran-
tee of the First Amendment, appears to be based upon a combination of
elements already deemed by the courts reasonable and necessary for protect-
ing the purity of elections.
IV
Aside from the very obvious complex group of criticisms based on the con-
stitutional and political thought of the traditional states' rights proponents,
S. 636 poses with its "centralization" provisions a number of additional prob-
lems. Some of the criticisms, to be sure, may tend to be similar to the argu-
ments advanced regularly by those even outside the South, to whom nearly
every and any further extension of federal control is nothing but an an-
athema.8 '
Other arguments can be based on the phaseology of the bill itself. It is
perfectly possible, for instance, to read S. 636 so as to require of every pre-
cinct committee the filing of at least seven separate reports. This require-
ment, in the judgment of the present chairman of the Republican National
Committee, in a state like New York with 10,457 precincts "may discourage
activity in politics rather than encourage it."' 82 This, of course, was not the
intention of those who wrote the bill.83
It has been suggested that the bill fails to give the candidate effective con-
trol over individual contributions not directed to his committee; 84 that an
already tired candidate would be additionally burdened with complex ac-
counting procedures; 85 that no limitation provisions are imposed on state
committees organized in support of a presidential and vice-presidential can-
didate;8 6 that the bill's definitions of "political committee" and "expendi-
'For example, Senator Jenner insists that "[a]ny effort of the Federal government to
dictate to the people of the states rules, regulations, and conduct for conducting an elec-
tion should be regarded with intense anxiety and vigorously resisted." Sen. Doc. No. 81,
82d Cong. 1st Sess. 26 (1951).
8 2Hearings, supra note 2, at 19. Senator Dirksen (R., Ill.) raised similar questions:
"I want to put no such burdens upon humble, good people at home who are interested in
politics. [Ibid., at 266.] Now, you are dealing with people back home at the grassroots,
solid, humble, God-fearing, ordinary citizens, to whom political organization is, among other
things, something of a diversion.... But one day he is standing on the street of a county
seat town visiting this little group, and some local attorney comes along and says, 'Say,
I just happened to think of something. You are the treasurer of the county committee. Did
you know how many reports you must file under Federal law, and do you know what the
penalties are?' " Ibid., at 259.
- Ibid., at 47, 106, 160. -Ibid., at 293, 122.
"Ibid., at 290. - Ibid., at 287, 288.
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tures" appear to be so broad as to bring into question bona fide expenditures
by such groups as the League of Women Voters 87 and the publishers of news-
papers;I s that the bill fails to put an end to the dispersal of contributions by
the very wealthy among the various members of their families; 9 and that the
bill's requirement calling for an accurate allocation of campaign expendi-
tures among the various national, state, and local candidates would prove
most difficult in practice due to the "party ticket" systemY0
It may also be noted that there is little indeed in S. 636 that might assist
those responsible for the enforcement of the corrupt practices statutes, in
their efforts to delineate as to where an organization's "institutional adver-
tising" or "educational" activities merge into outright partisan activities. As
so well expressed by a congressional committee twelve years ago, education
"very often takes the form of promoting in a 'non-partisan' manner social and
economic doctrines clearly associated in the public mind with one major
political party or the other .... [T]he bulk purchase of literature from psuedo-
educational organizations which employ the profit from these sales to distrib-
ute more political propaganda, is still another device encountered more than
once."
91
- Ibid., at 291. ' Ibid., at 285.
-Ibid., at 203, 305. -o Ibid., at 14, 19, 20, 34, 107.
'Report of the House Committee to Investigate Campaign Expenditures, 78th Cong.
2d Sess. 9 (1945). Also consult the testimony by Mr. Rumely, Executive Secretary of
the Committee for Constitutional Government, and by Mr. Pettengill, ibid., at 447-85;
by Mr. McCurdy, President, United Garment Workers of America, Hearings of the House
Committee to Investigate Campaign Expenditures, 79th Cong. 2d Sess. 359-67 (1946); and
by Mr. Weisenburger, Executive Vice President, National Ass'n of Manufacturers, ibid.,
at 196-201.
This issue was raised prominently in the bitterly fought Ohio campaign where 269 cor-
porations contributed $77,042 to a "Free Enterprise" series. The following testimony is
taken from the Hearings, supra note 47, at 181:
Sen. Smith: You have the newspaper pages on it. It is an example of the institutional
advertising we have been talking about. This first is Americanism versus Communism.
Can such an advertisement be hurtful to Mr. Ferguson? Mr. Taft's name is not men-
tioned in it, republicanism is not listed on it. Can that ad be against Mr. Ferguson?
Mr. Clayman [Secretary-Treasurer, Ohio CIO Council]: In the framework of the Ohio
election; yes....
Sen. Smith: You may believe that, but how can you prove that this is true, because
certainly Mr. Ferguson is as much for Americanism as Mr. Taft is from anything I have
observed.
Mr. Clayman: Oh, Mrs. Smith, surely you are realistic, and I am, too.
Sen. Smith: Yes.
Mr. Clayman: In heaven's name, when you know the campaign, it must be crystal
clear, the import of this kind of advertising. Of course, I can't parade before you the
people who paid for it and have them admit abjectly, 'Yes, we intended to help Mr.
Taft.'
Sen. Smith: I have a list of the people who paid for these, and I can't believe Ameri-
canism versus Communism can be charged to the campaign of either man so long as the
other man is not mentioned.
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To close all of these lacunae in the federal corrupt practices approach,
wide as they are, was obviously not the primary objective of the framers of
S. 636. Yet more effective "vertical" and "horizontal" centralized controls
over campaign finance are certainly sufficiently significant objectives in and of
themselves to warrant the most serious legislative attention. Of all the provi-
sions in S. 636, those aiming at the objective of centralization received perhaps
the most repeated and impressive expressions of approval by certain segments
of the press, 92 as well as by those political scientists 3 and party leaders 4
whose special comments had been invited by the committee.
A subjecting of the primaries to federal control alone would represent a
long overdue and realistic acknowledgment of the tremendous significance of
such elections in the entire fabric of American government and politics. It is
not known widely that during the last forty years, twenty-two of the states
had a political composition where second political parties won less than twen-
ty-five per cent of all presidential, senatorial, and gubernatorial elections.95 In
this very large group of states it is obviously the primary and not so much
the general elections, where the real contests are decided.
Another index of the political import of the primary contests is their rele-
vance to the struggle for legislative power in the congressional area itself. Of
the nineteen standing House committees in the 84th Congress, eight chairmen
"N.Y. Times, p. 20, col. 5 (April 8, 1955); Washington Post and Times Herald, p. 12,
col. 1 (April 12, 1955) ; Christian Science Monitor (April 11, 1955). A very strong endorse-
ment was given by America (April 30, 1955), as cited in Hearings, supra note 2, at 308, 311.
" Hearings, supra note 2. Those in accord include Professors Austin Ranney, University
of Illinois (ibid., at 283); James K. Pollock, University of Michigan (ibid., at 292);
Louise Overacker, Wellesley College (although she has some serious reservations about
"the practicability of requiring political committees working on behalf of a candidate to
secure authorization from him. . . ." ibid., at 290, 291, and Overacker, op. cit. supra
note 10); Robert F. Karsch, University of Missouri (ibid., at 285); Avery Lelerson, Van-
derbilt University (ibid., at 286); Cortez A. M. Ewing, University of Oklahoma (ibid., at
288); Peter H. Odegard, University of California (ibid., at 297); Clarence A. Berdahl,
University of Illinois (ibid., at 299); and Alfred De Grazia, Stanford University (ibid.,
at 292).
Ibid., at 84, 87. Paul M. Butler, chairman, Democratic National Committee, ibid., at
31, 33; Mr. Leonard W. Hall, chairman, Republican National Committee, testified that
"the purpose of the bill is good," but he registered serious reservations with respect to the
bill's extensive reporting system, candidate-centered approach and its subjecting of pri-
maries, conventions and caucuses to federal control, ibid., at 13-14.
'Ranney and Kendall, The American Party Systems, 48 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 477, 483
(1954). In this study it was found, rather significantly, that in 12 of these 22 states, the
second party usually won a "'substantial percentage' of the votes ... 30 per cent ... in
over 70 per cent of all elections ... 40 per cent ... in over 30 per cent of all elections."
Ibid., at 484. Consult further, a later study where it was observed that between 1870
and 1950 "[w]ell over half of the states gave the governorship to one party in 70 per
cent or more of the elections." Schlesinger, A Two-Dimensional Scheme for Classifying
the States According to Degree of Inter-Party Competition, 49 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 1120,
1123 (1955).
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had no major party opposition at all in the general election.9 6 In the same
Congress, of the fifteen standing committees of the Senate, seven were
chaired by senators who had also no major party opposition in the general
election.97
The provisions in S. 636 calling for a more candidate-centered or "hori-
zontal" control over campaign finance rank equally in political importance.
The candidate, now tragically all too often just a mere member of the
crew of a campaign ship, piloted by others, on a course set by others, could
now perhaps become the captain of his own ship. After all, to an extent not
insignificant, his name, his integrity, and his policies have been largely at the
mercy of those technically organized on his behalf, but in practice organized
too often in their own behalf. Some of the additional tasks of keeping track
of campaign funds, as required in S. 636, onerous as they may well be for an
already over-burdened candidate, might be worth the effort if it would help
to discourage but a little a resort to scurrilous literature and irresponsible
campaign charges by his overzealous supporters.
Then it may be contended, however, that the candidate-focused control
over campaign finance might tend to work to the detriment of a more respon-
sible party system. What is needed are not more independently operating
candidates, confusing the public with incompatible and undeliverable
promises, it may be claimed, but a more mature and issue-centered com-
plexion of American politics brought about more effectively by a better inte-
grated and disciplined major party system.
Moreover, although the interdependence of party and candidate must neces-
sarily vary greatly from situation to situation, the parties' present compli-
cated problems of allocating financial support among the different candidates
on the ticket would with S. 636 be made even more complicated.
Yet is it not equally true that there is nothing in the principle of "horizon-
tal" concentration of control, as provided in S. 636, that inherently retards
in any way the development of a healthy reciprocity between a more responsi-
ble candidate on the one hand and a more responsible party system on the
other? In the highly personality-centered framework of American politics,
sound political parties need sound candidates as much as, if not more than,
the candidates need such parties.
Proposals for subjecting primaries to federal regulations and devising
more candidate-centered controls over campaign finance have reappeared
Based on 13 Cong. Q. 82-85, 270-71 (1955). Included in this committee list are such
critical areas as Ways and Means, Foreign Affairs, Veterans Affairs, Post Office and Civil
Service, and Armed Services.
IIbid., at 56-57, 272. This list is similarly impressive, including committees on Foreign
Relations, Agriculture and Forestry, Banking and Currency, Finance, Government Oper-
ations, Post Office and Civil Service, and Armed Services.
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with peculiar regularity throughout at least a decade of hearings and in-
vestigations of campaign tactics, contests, and expenditures conducted by
numerous congressional committees. These objectives have been termed, by
various political scientists and practical politicians alike, as indispensable
minima. Without them any scheme for greater effectiveness and responsibility
in the control over campaign finance seems most doubtful of attainment.
Even so, there is still a notable congressional reluctance to enact into law
measures incorporating these minimum objectives. As a result of the now
famous Case incident in connection with the natural gas bill and its presi-
dential veto, another eight-member Select Committee has recently been
established to investigate once again the activities of lobbies and their rela-
tionship to legislative and election processes. Perhaps this committee may be
able now, in the light of its findings and recommendations, to succeed where
its predecessors have failed and at last persuade Congress to adopt such ob-
jectives as are recommended in S. 636. To accomplish this it will have to con-
vince the members of Congress that the legitimate and responsible aspirations
of groups and lobbies in a pluralistic society are thoroughly reconcilable with
legitimate and responsible campaign practices. The central approach incor-
porated in S. 636, despite its numerous practical problems of organization and
enforcement, appear constitutionally and politically sufficiently sound to
warrant its recommendation for an intensified congressional scrutiny and de-
bate as serious preliminaries for eventual statutory enactment.
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